

### 4.15 Safety and Security

This section summarizes Metro's existing safety and security measures, the existing police and fire protection services covering Metro facilities, and other safety and security issues in the project area. Potential impacts of the proposed alternatives on safety and security are evaluated in this section. Information in this section is based on the Safety and Security Technical Memorandum prepared for the project contained in Appendix CC of this EIS/EIR.

This section has been updated since publication of the Draft EIS/EIR to address comments received on the Draft EIS/EIR, as indicated in the Responses to Comments, Volumes F-2 and F-3, of this Final EIS/EIR, and based on refinements to the Locally Preferred Alternative (LPA). A vertical line in the margin is used to show where revisions have occurred to this section since publication of the Draft EIS/EIR, excluding minor edits for consistency and correction of formatting and minor typographical errors.

Minor modifications have been made to this section since publication of the Draft EIS/EIR, which include the addition of information from Appendix CC, Safety and Security Technical Memorandum. Since designation of an LPA, mitigation measures have been refined and confirmed for the LPA, which are listed in Section 4.15.4.2 below, based on input received during the Draft EIS/EIR public review period. No changes to the NEPA impact findings or CEQA impact determinations were identified as a result of refinements to the LPA, responses to comments, or other developments since publication of the Draft EIS/EIR. Mitigation measures listed for the LPA in this section have been carried forward and included in the Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Program (MMRP) for the LPA, Chapter 8, of this Final EIS/EIR.

The analysis of safety and security impacts associated with the LPA is detailed below in Section 4.15.3.5.

#### 4.15.1 Regulatory Framework

NEPA does not include specific guidance or direction for evaluating alternatives and relative effects of alternatives on public safety and security.

Appendix G of the California State CEQA Guidelines draws particular attention to those projects that would create a potential public health hazard or interfere with emergency response plans or emergency evacuation plans. A significant safety and security impact would occur under CEQA if an alternative would:

- Create the potential for increased pedestrian and/or bicycle safety risks
- Create substantial adverse safety conditions, including station, boarding, and disembarking accidents, right-of-way accidents, collisions, fires, and major structural failures

- Substantially limit the delivery of community safety services, such as police, fire, or emergency services, to locations along the proposed alignment
- Create the potential for adverse security conditions, including incidents, offenses, and crimes

Other safety and security regulations that would be applicable to the proposed project include:

- Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)
- Federal Transit Administration's (FTA's) State Safety Oversight Rule
- Uniform Fire Code
- California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Safety Rules and Regulations Governing Light-Rail Transit in California
- California Health and Safety Code
- Metro Emergency Response Plan
- Fire/Life Safety Design Criteria

More information regarding these regulations and criteria is available in Appendix CC, Safety and Security Technical Memorandum.

The evaluation of potential safety and security impacts focuses on criteria related to accident prevention (pedestrians, bicyclists, and employees), construction safety, fire protection and safety, security preventing criminal activity, security preventing terrorist attacks, and emergency response.

### 4.15.2 Affected Environment

Existing conditions along the Regional Connector Transit Corridor project's alternative alignments were assessed to establish a baseline for comparing alternatives. The assessment of existing safety and security conditions in the project area is described below.

#### 4.15.2.1 Safety

Metro is the regional agency that serves as transportation planner and coordinator, designer, builder, and regional operator of transit services in Los Angeles County. Metro is regulated by the CPUC. Metro operates all transit-related vehicles according to the guidelines established by the CPUC. In operating light rail transit (LRT), subways, and bus transit (including dedicated bus transit ways) throughout Los Angeles County, Metro has established departments to address specific issues. One department is the Transit Education Programs Department, which creates programs to educate the public on proper safety practices with respect to LRT.

### *4.15.2.1.1 Pedestrian Safety*

Downtown Los Angeles contains a great diversity of streets, places, buildings, and environments. A high level of pedestrian traffic occurs in the project area. Pedestrian density is most concentrated in the vicinity of commercial and governmental facilities in the Civic Center and Financial District. Most intersections in the project area allow pedestrian crossings along all four sides, though some crossings are prohibited, particularly at three-way intersections or intersections between two-way and one-way streets. Colored asphalt is used in many project area crosswalks for enhanced visibility. Since the streets are on a grid with few curves, sight distance is good overall, and there are only a handful of atypical intersections (five-way, frontage road, etc.). Streets are well-lit throughout the project area. More information about the existing at-grade intersection conditions applicable to pedestrian safety within the project area are provided in Appendix CC, Safety and Security Technical Memorandum.

### **4.15.2.2 Security**

The affected environment is the security on the rail system, both at the stations and in the light rail vehicles. Passengers, transit employees, vendors, contractors, and the general public who come in contact with the system as well as the transit property and equipment would be susceptible to the same crimes as experienced in the surrounding neighborhoods of all four alternative alignments, such as assault or robbery.

Security issues may be related to police and fire response, emergency evacuation, and addressing criminal and terrorist activity. An at-grade system is vulnerable to both public demonstrations and vehicle-borne or other improvised explosive devices. The underground portions of the alignment are less vulnerable to these types of security concerns; however, in recent years terrorist acts have occurred at underground rail systems in some of the major capitols of the world. In addition, underground systems have a greater potential for safety issues related to evacuation needs. A complete Threat and Vulnerability Assessment in compliance with FTA regulations will be conducted for the LPA, or other project alternative, after it is adopted by the Metro Board of Directors.

Features included for passenger security are closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV), emergency call boxes, fully lighted station stops and transit parking areas. These features are within all trains and buses, as well as rail stations, and are designed to offer security and a personal sense of well being for passengers.

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has primary policing responsibility for this area. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's (LACSD) Transit Services Bureau, the second largest transit services bureau in the country, already provides exclusive contract police services to Metro, which operates the public transit system serving Los Angeles County. Sheriff Deputies provide police services for both the light rail and bus transportation systems throughout 1,433 square miles.

The contract with LACSD would be extended to cover the Regional Connector Transit Corridor. LACSD security personnel and deputies patrol the transit system routes and stations. LACSD security personnel work primarily on fare evasion and passenger complaints. Both the LAPD and LACSD are active members of the Regional Transit Security Working Group. Additionally,

Metro personnel receive Community Emergency Response Training in collaboration with the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD). This training includes earthquake awareness, disaster medical procedures, and rescue operations.

Metro and LACSD regularly coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at several levels. They both work through the Regional Transit Security Working Group, are members of the local Joint Terrorist Task Force, and both coordinate with the area Federal Security Director for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Metro is currently in compliance with all TSA directives as well as with 49 CFR 1580, which requires designating a rail security coordinator and reporting significant security concerns to TSA. For more information regarding existing security conditions and statistics on Metro operations within the project area, please refer to Appendix CC, Safety and Security Technical Memorandum.

### 4.15.3 Environmental Impacts/Environmental Consequences

The following sections summarize the evaluation of potential safety and security impacts for each alternative. Impact conclusions for all of the alternatives are based on the thresholds identified above in Section 4.15.1. Table 4.15-1 summarizes the results of the analysis.

**Table 4.15-1. Summary of Potential Impacts to Safety and Security Conditions**

Alternative	Potential Effects (NEPA/CEQA)	Adverse NEPA Effects After Mitigation	Significant CEQA Impacts After Mitigation
No Build	None	None	None
TSM	None	None	None
At-Grade Emphasis LRT	No adverse effect/less than significant impact after mitigation	None	None
Underground Emphasis LRT	No adverse effect/less than significant impact after mitigation (potential effect/impact less than At-Grade Emphasis LRT Alternative)	None	None
LPA	No adverse effect/less than significant impact after mitigation (potential effect/impact less than At-Grade Emphasis LRT and Underground Emphasis LRT Alternatives)	None	None

#### 4.15.3.1 No Build Alternative

The No Build Alternative would maintain the current level of transit service in the project corridor and therefore, would not have a direct or indirect impact on public safety or accidents during construction or operation of the alternative. Given that the alternative would not have a direct or indirect impact on public safety or accidents, the No Build Alternative would not result in a cumulative impact.

### *4.15.3.1.1 NEPA Finding*

The No Build Alternative would have no effect on safety or security within the project area.

### *4.15.3.1.2 CEQA Determination*

The No Build Alternative would have no impact on safety or security within the project area.

### **4.15.3.2 TSM Alternative**

The TSM Alternative would maintain the current level of transit service in the project corridor and also increase cross-station opportunities by adding two new express shuttle buses. The TSM Alternative would not have a detrimental and/or increased impact on public safety or accidents. Buses would operate on existing streets, so changes to the existing environment and direct impacts would not occur with this alternative. A potential indirect impact would be the “induced demand” created by better and more frequent service for the overall LRT system by providing the express shuttle buses. More people could be brought into a defined geographic area, possibly resulting in potential new conflicts between transit and pedestrians and motorists.

When considered in combination with other reasonably foreseeable projects in the project area, the TSM Alternative would not have either a construction-related or operational cumulative effect because there would not be direct or indirect effects.

### *4.15.3.2.1 NEPA Finding*

The TSM Alternative would not result in adverse safety or security effects.

### *4.15.3.2.2 CEQA Determination*

The TSM Alternative would not result in significant safety or security impacts.

### **4.15.3.3 At-Grade Emphasis LRT Alternative**

The At-Grade Emphasis LRT Alternative could affect the pedestrian environment, motorist safety, and emergency response times for emergency service providers during both construction and LRT operation.

### *4.15.3.3.1 Pedestrian Safety*

Pedestrian safety was evaluated at proposed station locations (near the trackway) and at designated grade crossings. Adding light rail vehicles would be the primary new safety hazard for pedestrian traffic along the proposed alignment. The speed of the vehicles would be similar to or slower than adjacent automobile traffic. The light rail vehicles (LRVs) would be electrically powered and, therefore, quieter than most automobile traffic and may not be easily heard. This hazard includes crossings at intersections where pedestrians cross over the light rail tracks, and human intrusion on the right-of-way (jaywalking). Of the build alternatives, the At-Grade Emphasis LRT Alternative has the greatest length of street running alignment, and therefore more locations where pedestrian safety concerns could occur which could result in significant impacts.

#### *4.15.3.3.2 Motorist Safety*

Design solutions and operating characteristics would address potential motorist safety issues. Measures would include sizing stations to accommodate the anticipated number of passengers, channelization techniques to direct pedestrians to designated pedestrian crossings, “Train Approaching” signs, traffic-signal phasing (all-red phase and lagging left turns), low operating speeds of LRVs, left-turn restrictions along 2<sup>nd</sup> Street when LRVs are approaching, and preparation of grade crossing applications in coordination with the CPUC. These design solutions and LRT operating characteristics would reduce potential pedestrian and motorist safety concerns to a less than significant level.

#### *4.15.3.3.3 Security*

Security issues may be related to police and fire response, emergency evacuation, and addressing criminal and terrorist activity. The project would include coordination with police and fire services to develop construction and operation plans and provide appropriate public safety and security for the Metro system, employees, and surrounding communities. The LACSD policing contract with Metro would be extended to include the Regional Connector Transit Corridor project, and the project would be coordinated and compliant with TSA/DHS. To mitigate potential safety and security concerns, a complete Threat and Vulnerability Assessment in compliance with FTA regulations would be conducted for the adopted LPA, if approved.

Given project design features, the grade crossing application process, and the Threat and Vulnerability Assessment, potential indirect impacts associated with the At-Grade Emphasis LRT Alternative would not have a detrimental and/or increased impact on public safety or accidents during both construction and LRT operation.

As with the proposed project, other projects within the area of influence of this proposed alternative would address safety and security of pedestrians and motorists accessing the developments. From a cumulative perspective, potential impacts associated with the At-Grade Emphasis LRT Alternative would be mitigated to a less than significant level and would not have a cumulative effect on the safety and security environment in the project area during both construction and LRT operation.

#### *4.15.3.3.4 NEPA Finding*

The At-Grade Emphasis LRT Alternative would not have adverse effects on safety and security after proposed mitigation measures are implemented.

#### *4.15.3.3.5 CEQA Determination*

The At-Grade Emphasis LRT Alternative would not have significant impacts on safety and security after proposed mitigation measures are implemented.

### **4.15.3.4 Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative**

The Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative could affect the pedestrian environment, motorist safety, and emergency response times for emergency service providers during both construction and LRT operation.

### *4.15.3.4.1 Pedestrian Safety*

Pedestrian safety considerations would apply primarily to proposed at-grade segments. These concerns do not arise with underground LRT facilities (there are no trackway crossings for pedestrians or vehicles) and where applicable, stations could be designed to avoid these concerns (e.g., a design that avoids the need for pedestrians to cross tracks and the potential for collisions with LRVs). Since the Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative alignment would be almost entirely underground, few pedestrian safety concerns would arise, but could still be potentially significant. Pedestrian safety concerns associated with the Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative would be less compared to the At-Grade Emphasis LRT Alternative.

### *4.15.3.4.2 Motorist Safety*

The only at-grade crossing proposed for the Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative is located at 1<sup>st</sup> and Alameda Streets. At this location, most vehicles and pedestrians would be grade-separated from the LRT tracks, with a potential pedestrian bridge proposed over the intersection and a new underpass allowing traffic on Alameda Street to travel below 1<sup>st</sup> Street and the LRT tracks. For motor vehicles and LRVs operating at-grade at this intersection, Metro would prepare grade crossing applications in coordination with the CPUC and local public agencies. The grade-separated nature of the Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative would avoid these potential effects which would not result in significant impacts to the project area.

### *4.15.3.4.3 Security*

Security issues may be related to police and fire response, emergency evacuation, and addressing criminal and terrorist activity. The project would include coordination with police and fire services to develop construction and operation plans and provide appropriate public safety and security for the Metro system, employees, and surrounding communities. The LACSD policing contract with Metro would be extended to include the Regional Connector Transit Corridor project, and the project would be coordinated and compliant with TSA/DHS. To mitigate potential safety and security concerns, a complete Threat and Vulnerability Assessment in compliance with FTA regulations would be conducted for the adopted LPA. For the Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative, this would include a complete evacuation plan to mitigate any potential safety concerns.

Potential indirect impacts associated with the Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative would not have a detrimental or increased effect on public safety or accidents during both construction and LRT operation.

As with the proposed project, other projects within the area of influence of this proposed alternative would address safety and security of pedestrians and motorists accessing the developments. Potential impacts of the Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative would be mitigated to a less than significant level and therefore, would not have a cumulative effect on the safety and security environment in the project area during either construction or LRT operation.

### *4.15.3.4.4 NEPA Finding*

The Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative would not have adverse effects on safety and security after proposed mitigation measures are implemented.

#### *4.15.3.4.5 CEQA Determination*

The Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative would not have significant impacts on safety and security after proposed mitigation measures are implemented.

#### **4.15.3.5 Locally Preferred Alternative**

The LPA could affect the pedestrian environment, motorist safety, and emergency response times for emergency service providers during both construction and LRT operation. The potential safety and security effects of the LPA would be similar to those for the Underground Emphasis LRT Alternative for all areas west of Central Avenue.

##### *4.15.3.5.1 Pedestrian and Motorist Safety*

Pedestrian and motorist safety considerations identified previously would apply primarily to proposed at-grade locations. The LPA results in the entire LRT facility being placed underground, eliminating all potential conflicts with at-grade roadway and pedestrian infrastructure. Therefore, the proposed alternative and associated design would avoid potential safety effects related to both pedestrian and motorist crossings during operations. The grade-separated nature of the LPA would avoid these potential effects and no impact would occur. Mitigation measures are proposed in Section 4.15.4.2 to offset potential safety concerns during construction.

##### *4.15.3.5.2 Security*

Security issues may be related to police and fire response, emergency evacuation, and addressing criminal and terrorist activity. The project would include coordination with police and fire services to develop construction and operation plans and provide appropriate public safety and security for the Metro system, employees, and surrounding communities. The LACSD policing contract with Metro would be extended to include the Regional Connector project, and the project would be coordinated and compliant with TSA/DHS. To mitigate potential safety and security concerns, a complete Threat and Vulnerability Assessment in compliance with FTA regulations would be conducted for the LPA, if adopted by the Metro Board of Directors. For the LPA, this would include a complete evacuation plan to mitigate any potential safety concerns.

Potential indirect impacts associated with the LPA would not have a detrimental or increased impact on public safety or accidents during both construction and LRT operation.

As with the proposed project, other projects within the area of influence of this proposed alternative would address safety and security of pedestrians and motorists accessing the developments. From a cumulative perspective, potential impacts associated with the LPA would be mitigated to a less than significant level and the LPA would not have a considerable contribution to cumulative effects on the safety and security environment in the project area during both construction and LRT operation.

The Broad Art Foundation Museum, currently under construction, is anticipated to include a pedestrian plaza above General Thaddeus Kosciuszko Way connecting to Upper Grand Avenue. In order to provide access from the 2<sup>nd</sup>/Hope Street station to Upper Grand Avenue, Metro

would build an elevator from the station entrance to the plaza if one is not already provided by the Broad Art Foundation Museum project. If the plaza is not built, Metro would construct a pedestrian connection (such as a pedestrian bridge) from the elevator to Upper Grand Avenue. The proposed pedestrian bridge, whether built by the Broad Art Foundation or Metro, would reduce potential pedestrian/LRT/vehicle conflicts by providing a separated facility for pedestrians trying to reach the station, especially from the high pedestrian generator Walt Disney Concert Hall.

#### **4.15.3.5.3 NEPA Finding**

The LPA will not have adverse effects on safety and security with implementation of proposed mitigation measures.

#### **4.15.3.5.4 CEQA Determination**

The LPA would not have significant impacts on safety and security with implementation of proposed mitigation measures and, therefore, would not have a considerable contribution to cumulative effects on the safety and security environment in the project area during construction or LRT operation.

### **4.15.4 Mitigation Measures**

#### **4.15.4.1 Updates to the Candidate Mitigation Measures from the Draft EIS/EIR**

The Draft EIS/EIR included candidate mitigation measures for review and comment by the public, agencies and other stakeholders. Since publication of the Draft EIS/EIR, Metro has adjusted and added specificity to the candidate mitigation measures for safety and security impacts presented in the Draft EIS/EIR. The final LPA mitigation measures, shown in Section 4.15.4.2 below, are included in the MMRP for the LPA, Chapter 8, of this Final EIS/EIR, and supersede candidate mitigation measures identified in the Draft EIS/EIR. Updates to the mitigation measures made since publication of the Draft EIS/EIR include:

- Additional detail has been provided for the construction and operational mitigation measures for consistency with other sections, such as additional detail regarding Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements, the traffic management and construction mitigation plans, and the protection of public use areas.

#### **4.15.4.2 Final Mitigation Measures for the Locally Preferred Alternative**

Mitigation measures listed for the LPA in this section have been carried forward and included in the MMRP for the LPA, Chapter 8, of this Final EIS/EIR. They are the final committed mitigation measures for the LPA. MMRP index numbers are shown in parenthesis after each mitigation measure.

#### *4.15.4.2.1 Final Construction Mitigation Measures for the Locally Preferred Alternative*

- Accessible detours shall be provided whenever possible. Detours shall be compliant with the ADA. Signage shall be provided in those languages most commonly spoken in the immediate community. Signs shall mark detours in accordance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, and other applicable local and state requirements. Detours shall be designed to minimize cut-through traffic in adjacent residential areas. (CN-1)
- Early notification of traffic disruption shall be given to emergency service providers. Work plans and traffic control measures shall be coordinated with emergency responders to prevent impacts to emergency response times. (CN-2)
- Traffic management and construction mitigation plans shall be developed in coordination with the community to minimize disruption and limit construction activities during special events. Worksite Traffic Control Plans shall be developed in conjunction with LADOT and surrounding communities to minimize impacts to traffic, businesses, residents, and other stakeholders. Crossing guards and other temporary traffic controls shall be provided in the vicinity of construction sites, haul routes, and other relevant sites as proposed in California DOT Traffic Manual, Section 10-07.3, Warrants for Adult Crossing Guards, and as appropriate to maintain traffic flow during construction. (CN-3)
- Metro shall protect public use of work areas involving sidewalks, entrances to buildings, lobbies, corridors, aisles, stairways, and vehicular roadways with appropriate guardrails, barricades, temporary fences, overhead protection, temporary partitions, shields, and adequate visibility. Metro shall keep sidewalks, entrances to buildings, lobbies, corridors, aisles, doors, or exits that remain in use by the public clear of obstructions. Metro shall post appropriate warnings, signs, and instructional safety signs. These requirements shall be included in the construction specifications. (SS-15)
- Safe pedestrian detours with handrails, fences, k-rail, canopies, and walkways shall be provided as needed. When a crosswalk is closed due to construction activities, pedestrians shall be directed to nearby alternate crosswalks. Access shall be ADA accessible at all times per existing Metro policy. (TR-4)
- Metro shall develop a Construction Mitigation Program that includes protocol for community notification of construction activities, including traffic control measures, schedule of activities, and duration of operations, with written communications to the community translated into appropriate languages. (DR-7)

#### *4.15.4.2.2 Final Operational Mitigation Measures for the Locally Preferred Alternative*

- Fire alarm protection shall be provided within station areas as required by applicable laws, regulations, and standards. (SS-1)
- A minimum of two fire emergency routes shall be provided from each station as required by applicable laws, regulations, and standards. (SS-2)

- Adequate emergency ventilation and lighting shall be provided in each station in accordance with Metro Fire/Life Safety Standards and City of Los Angeles building codes. (SS-3)
- Communication systems between adjoining fire agencies shall be provided as required by applicable laws, regulations, and standards. (SS-4)
- A methane detection system shall be provided in each station as required by applicable laws, regulations, and standards. (SS-5)
- Building construction for underground stations shall not be less than Type I Construction as defined in the Uniform Building Code. All stations with more than two levels below-grade or where the lowest occupied level is more than 80 feet below-grade shall have protected level separation or other protection features to provide safe egress to exits. (SS-6)
- All proposed mitigation measures regarding safety and security shall be implemented in a manner conformant to Metro's Rail Transit Design Criteria and Standards and Fire/Life Safety Criteria. A combination of the following measures shall be implemented as indicated by the Threat and Vulnerability Assessment: CCTV system, emergency push-button call system for patrons, intrusion detection system, dedicated security patrol protocols and procedures, and crime prevention through environmental design. (SS-7)
- Proposed station designs shall not include design elements that obstruct visibility or observation, nor provide discrete locations favorable to crime. Proposed stations shall be lighted to avoid shadows. Pedestrian pathways shall include clear sight lines whenever feasible. Project sidewalk widths and placements shall be appropriately designed to accommodate a wide variety of users. The following criteria shall be used when designing project sidewalks: sidewalk and pedestrian bridge widths shall be designed with the widest dimensions feasible (at least ten feet) in conformance with Metro's adopted land use and transportation policies; minimum sidewalk widths shall not be less than those allowed by the State of California Title 24 access requirements or the ADA design recommendations; where practicable, pedestrian movements and flows shall be favored over other transportation modes, such as automobile access; and stations shall be fully accessible as defined by ADA. (SS-8)
- An ADA accessible connection for the 2<sup>nd</sup>/Hope Street station to Upper Grand Avenue shall be provided. The future Broad Art Foundation Museum, currently under construction, is projected to include a plaza above General Thaddeus Kosciuszko Way connecting to Upper Grand Avenue. In order to provide access from the 2<sup>nd</sup>/Hope Street station to Upper Grand Avenue, an elevator from the station entrance to the plaza shall be built as part of this alternative if one is not already provided. If the plaza is not built, a pedestrian connection (such as a pedestrian bridge) shall be constructed. The connection shall reduce conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles. (SS-9)
- Adequate pedestrian queuing and refuge areas shall be provided at the proposed stations to facilitate pedestrian mobility. Adequately wide crosswalks shall be provided in the areas immediately around the proposed stations. (SS-10)

- All proposed stations shall be equipped with monitoring equipment, which shall primarily consist of video surveillance to monitor strategic areas of the stations and walkways and/or be monitored by Metro security personnel on a regular basis. (SS-11)
- Metro shall implement a security plan for LRT operations to include both in-car and station surveillance by Metro security or other local jurisdiction security personnel. Metro shall coordinate and consult with the LAFD, LAPD, and LACSD as appropriate to develop safety and security plans for the proposed alignment and station areas. (SS-12)
- Trains and/or platforms shall be equipped with safety features that reduce the potential for persons to contact the vehicle coupler and/or fall under the train. (SS-13)
- Fire separations shall be provided and maintained in public occupancy areas as required by regulation. (SS-14)
- An education safety and outreach campaign shall be implemented during construction to address public safety awareness in the vicinity of the project. The campaign would target the diverse community in the project area to educate them on proper system use and benefits of LRT ridership. (SS-16)